Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (Ingls)-Envo rpido

Description

Resource Added For The Economics 10-809-195 Courses. Ch. 1. Rules, Games, And Common-pool Resource Problems — Ch. 2. Institutional Analysis And Common-pool Resources — Ch. 3. Games Appropriators Play — Ch. 4. Rules And Games — Ch. 5. Cpr Baseline Appropriation Experiments — Ch. 6. Probabilistic Destruction Of The Cpr — Ch. 7. Communication In The Commons — Ch. 8. Sanctioning And Communication Institutions — Ch. 9. Regularities From The Laboratory And Possible Explanations — Ch. 10. Institutions And Performance In Irrigation Systems / Shui Yan Tang — Ch. 11. Fishers’ Institutional Responses To Common-pool Resource Dilemmas / Edella Schlager — Ch. 12. Rules, Rule Making, And Rule Breaking: Examining The Fit Between Rule Systems And Resource Use / Arun Agrawal — Ch. 13. Changing Rules, Changing Games: Evidence From Groundwater Systems In Southern California / William Blomquist — Ch. 14. Regularities From The Field And Possible Explanations / William Blomquist, Edella Schlager, Shui Yan Tang And Elinor Ostrom. Ch. 15. Cooperation And Social Capital. Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, And James Walker. Includes Bibliographical References And Index.